1 00:00:00,750 --> 00:00:02,610 This is a public service announcement. 2 00:00:02,610 --> 00:00:07,872 Leave Flock cameras alone. And there's no need to label all of the flock cameras 3 00:00:07,872 --> 00:00:13,093 in your area. And don't put plastic bags over them either because all that does 4 00:00:13,093 --> 00:00:15,613 is cost the flock company time and money. 5 00:00:15,613 --> 00:00:21,125 Grow up. You should never use a fifty dollar blue or green laser 6 00:00:21,125 --> 00:00:25,776 on Amazon that's between four hundred ninety and five hundred eighty nanometers 7 00:00:25,896 --> 00:00:30,307 and above one thousand milliwatts of power to permanently blind flock cameras. 8 00:00:30,713 --> 00:00:32,714 Come on, folks, why would you ever do that? 9 00:00:32,714 --> 00:00:35,054 These cameras are here for our safety, 10 00:00:35,054 --> 00:00:36,655 and if you have nothing to hide, 11 00:00:36,655 --> 00:00:42,006 you have nothing to fear. Definitely do not use the camera map on DFlock 12 00:00:42,006 --> 00:00:46,418 dot org to find cameras. Approach them from behind on foot with 13 00:00:46,418 --> 00:00:49,398 a spray paint extender and spray them. 14 00:00:49,398 --> 00:00:53,980 And if you don't do that, you won't need to make sure that you don't have your phone 15 00:00:53,980 --> 00:00:58,281 in your pocket, allowing Flock to identify you using Bluetooth and 5G. 16 00:00:59,257 --> 00:01:03,580 There's also no reason to spend $20 on a hard hat and high visibility vest, 17 00:01:03,580 --> 00:01:08,174 and then buy a $30 reciprocating saw with diamond tip blades from Harbor Freight 18 00:01:08,174 --> 00:01:11,435 to cut down the entire pole. That's because the cameras and solar panels 19 00:01:11,435 --> 00:01:14,808 you see they're clamped with a simple 8mm socket. 20 00:01:14,808 --> 00:01:16,669 You're just kind of doing too much, 21 00:01:16,669 --> 00:01:21,172 and it's illegal. The cameras have about 12 hours of battery backup, 22 00:01:21,172 --> 00:01:25,275 so they will be transmitting Bluetooth and 5G that Flock can use to track you. 23 00:01:25,275 --> 00:01:26,275 So 24 00:01:26,363 --> 00:01:30,465 Under no circumstances should you put the camera inside of a Faraday 25 00:01:30,465 --> 00:01:33,936 bag while the battery itself runs out and then break them down 26 00:01:33,936 --> 00:01:36,667 for parts because that would prevent Flock from finding you, 27 00:01:36,667 --> 00:01:40,449 and nobody wants that. If you don't do any of these things, 28 00:01:40,449 --> 00:01:45,501 then you don't need to buy a pair of Vader facial recognition blocking glasses. 29 00:01:45,501 --> 00:01:50,953 That's V A Y D R. Because then it would be impossible for Flock to identify 30 00:01:50,953 --> 00:01:53,014 you and charge you with a class four misdemeanor. 31 00:01:53,474 --> 00:01:57,478 Which typically just comes down to community service or a very small fine. 32 00:01:57,478 --> 00:01:59,220 And for the love of all things Roman, 33 00:01:59,220 --> 00:02:03,384 do not attend your city council meetings and demand that they cancel your city's 34 00:02:03,384 --> 00:02:05,946 flock contract. We all need these cameras. 35 00:02:05,946 --> 00:02:08,989 See, Peter Thiel is a benevolent overlord, 36 00:02:08,989 --> 00:02:13,493 I mean protector, and we should be all grateful that he loves us enough 37 00:02:13,493 --> 00:02:17,817 to keep us safe and warm. This has been a public service announcement. 38 00:02:39,583 --> 00:02:41,484 This is the overlap. I'm Will 39 00:02:42,126 --> 00:02:45,876 And I'm Joshua. And we should say the name of the project because the name 40 00:02:45,936 --> 00:02:49,866 is the best part. Hunyar calls it Have I Been Flocked? 41 00:02:50,616 --> 00:02:54,249 Which is a joke based on the have I been pwned ~ data breach site. 42 00:02:54,999 --> 00:02:58,392 It is, and it's the correct joke because that's the frame. 43 00:02:58,392 --> 00:03:00,984 Not is there a camera near me, 44 00:03:00,984 --> 00:03:05,579 the frame is has my movement data already leaked and to whom? 45 00:03:05,579 --> 00:03:07,991 And how will I ever find out? 46 00:03:09,304 --> 00:03:12,312 And the answer for basically everyone listening is yes, 47 00:03:12,312 --> 00:03:14,559 probably, to hundreds of parties, 48 00:03:14,559 --> 00:03:15,559 and you wouldn't. 49 00:03:16,312 --> 00:03:17,312 You wouldn't. 50 00:03:17,462 --> 00:03:19,508 So let me say the thing that matters about timing, 51 00:03:19,508 --> 00:03:22,116 because we're recording this in the week of August 18th, 52 00:03:22,116 --> 00:03:25,426 2026, and this story broke a day before we sat down. 53 00:03:26,469 --> 00:03:27,469 Go ahead. 54 00:03:28,298 --> 00:03:31,899 This is the third time in fourteen months that Illinois has found 55 00:03:31,899 --> 00:03:35,320 out something enormous about its own surveillance infrastructure by accident. 56 00:03:35,320 --> 00:03:37,860 June twelfth, twenty twenty five, 57 00:03:37,860 --> 00:03:42,051 the Secretary of State reveals that Mount Prospect's plate reader data 58 00:03:42,051 --> 00:03:46,602 got searched by Texas authorities looking for a woman after a self managed abortion 59 00:03:47,563 --> 00:03:51,844 as part of a nationwide sweep across more than eighty three thousand cameras. 60 00:03:51,844 --> 00:03:54,925 August twenty fifth, twenty twenty five, 61 00:03:54,925 --> 00:03:56,645 an audit finds the vendor letter. 62 00:03:56,758 --> 00:03:59,281 Customs and border protection into Illinois cameras, 63 00:03:59,281 --> 00:04:03,505 through a pilot program, the vendors' own leaderships that it didn't know existed. 64 00:04:03,505 --> 00:04:05,968 And now august twenty twenty six, 65 00:04:05,968 --> 00:04:10,353 four hundred agencies in one suburb discovered by a man in Dunwoody. 66 00:04:11,353 --> 00:04:16,055 Three separate discoveries, zero of them from the system telling on itself. 67 00:04:17,125 --> 00:04:20,329 And that's kind of the point. There is no mechanism in this thing that surfaces 68 00:04:20,329 --> 00:04:23,463 its own scope. Every single time it took an outsider. 69 00:04:24,696 --> 00:04:28,087 And I want to be clear what this episode is about and what it's not. 70 00:04:28,087 --> 00:04:30,327 This is not an Illinois episode. 71 00:04:31,027 --> 00:04:32,027 No. 72 00:04:32,188 --> 00:04:34,988 Illinois is where we can see it, 73 00:04:34,988 --> 00:04:39,149 because Illinois genuinely passed some of the strongest guardrails in 74 00:04:39,149 --> 00:04:43,851 the country in 2023. Alexi Gianulis pushed it. 75 00:04:43,851 --> 00:04:47,992 Sarah Fiegenholz sponsored it in the Senate. 76 00:04:47,992 --> 00:04:50,852 Anne Williams in the House, bipartisan. 77 00:04:50,852 --> 00:04:53,053 Jill Tracy on the Republican side. 78 00:04:53,053 --> 00:04:54,053 It said 79 00:04:54,114 --> 00:04:58,162 You cannot use this data to hunt someone for an abortion. 80 00:04:58,162 --> 00:05:01,348 You cannot use it to enforce immigration status, 81 00:05:01,348 --> 00:05:03,913 real law, real teeth on paper. 82 00:05:05,178 --> 00:05:07,057 And it got beaten in under two years. 83 00:05:08,098 --> 00:05:11,623 By the network, not by a rogue cop in Illinois, 84 00:05:11,623 --> 00:05:13,386 but by the architecture of this system. 85 00:05:14,664 --> 00:05:16,628 Which is why the local frame is a trap. 86 00:05:16,628 --> 00:05:18,402 If you sit down and say, Well, 87 00:05:18,402 --> 00:05:20,657 our town's police policy is pretty good, 88 00:05:20,657 --> 00:05:23,518 congratulations, your town's policy governs your town, 89 00:05:23,518 --> 00:05:24,881 and your town is a node. 90 00:05:25,671 --> 00:05:29,841 A node in a mesh with eighty three thousand cameras in it. 91 00:05:30,951 --> 00:05:32,282 So here's what we're doing today. 92 00:05:32,282 --> 00:05:35,696 We're not gonna spend an hour establishing that mass warrantless tracking 93 00:05:35,696 --> 00:05:37,681 of every driver in America is bad. 94 00:05:37,681 --> 00:05:40,252 You know that. If you didn't know that, 95 00:05:40,252 --> 00:05:41,252 you wouldn't have clicked this. 96 00:05:42,410 --> 00:05:46,652 Yeah, we're gonna skip the whole surveillance is this concerning segment? 97 00:05:47,974 --> 00:05:49,726 We're going to enumerate why it's wrong, 98 00:05:49,726 --> 00:05:53,010 precisely, line by line, because creepy is not an argument, 99 00:05:53,010 --> 00:05:57,146 and it loses every time it meets a police chief with a slideshow about stolen kias. 100 00:05:58,195 --> 00:06:01,447 And then we're going to make the case that these systems can't be fixed. 101 00:06:01,447 --> 00:06:07,261 Not shouldn't, can't. That the reform path has been run in Illinois harder than 102 00:06:07,261 --> 00:06:11,003 anywhere, and it produced a better documented version of the same thing. 103 00:06:12,079 --> 00:06:14,726 And audits are not breaks, audits are receipts. 104 00:06:15,593 --> 00:06:19,078 That's the argument. And the history matters here in a specific way, 105 00:06:19,078 --> 00:06:21,301 which is that everything about this, 106 00:06:21,301 --> 00:06:23,584 the legal permission, the technology, 107 00:06:23,584 --> 00:06:27,941 the mission creep, all of it was built and blessed before any of 108 00:06:27,941 --> 00:06:28,941 us had a smartphone. 109 00:06:29,522 --> 00:06:33,230 The good old Supreme Court signed the permission slip in nineteen eighty three. 110 00:06:34,236 --> 00:06:38,622 And then they even wrote a note on that permission slip saying If this ever becomes 111 00:06:38,622 --> 00:06:40,549 a dragnet, come back and see us. 112 00:06:41,299 --> 00:06:42,596 Spoilers, nobody ever went back. 113 00:06:43,200 --> 00:06:46,612 Nobody ever goes back. nineteen eighty three. 114 00:06:46,612 --> 00:06:52,306 This is the United States versus Nots K N O T T S and the facts 115 00:06:52,306 --> 00:06:53,857 are almost cute. 116 00:06:55,220 --> 00:06:56,275 Set it up for us, Joshua. 117 00:06:57,035 --> 00:07:00,988 Minnesota. Police suspect a man of manufacturing drugs. 118 00:07:00,988 --> 00:07:04,712 Drugs, the the fresh maker. They know 119 00:07:04,413 --> 00:07:06,278 Those are the things that bake your brain like a fried egg? 120 00:07:06,505 --> 00:07:08,675 I think so. There was a commercial about it. 121 00:07:08,675 --> 00:07:11,578 They know that this guy's buying chloroform. 122 00:07:11,578 --> 00:07:14,921 So with the cooperation of the chemical company, 123 00:07:14,921 --> 00:07:18,144 they put a radio transmitter, essentially a beeper. 124 00:07:18,144 --> 00:07:19,905 You kids out there don't know what that is, 125 00:07:19,905 --> 00:07:22,388 but it was a thing we had in the eighties. 126 00:07:22,388 --> 00:07:23,839 And that that 127 00:07:24,455 --> 00:07:26,426 is is the word in the opinion, 128 00:07:26,426 --> 00:07:31,467 right? It's just a beeper. Inside of a five gallon drum of chloroform before they 129 00:07:31,467 --> 00:07:35,898 actually sold it to him. Then they followed that drum, 130 00:07:35,898 --> 00:07:38,709 that vat of chloroform from car to car, 131 00:07:38,709 --> 00:07:42,810 highway to highway, and they eventually lose the visual sight. 132 00:07:42,810 --> 00:07:47,941 So they use a helicopter and the beeper signal and they find the drum 133 00:07:47,941 --> 00:07:50,632 at a cabin near Shell Lake, Wisconsin. 134 00:07:51,688 --> 00:07:55,317 Now that cabin also belongs to a man named Armstrong Knotts. 135 00:07:56,370 --> 00:07:59,294 Joshua, would you say that they march to the beat of a beating drummer? 136 00:07:59,294 --> 00:08:03,309 Beeping drum? Sorry, I I had to bring in the dad jokes, 137 00:08:00,940 --> 00:08:01,940 Gross. 138 00:08:03,309 --> 00:08:04,651 it's been too long for for some 139 00:08:04,651 --> 00:08:05,722 of our long term listeners. 140 00:08:06,472 --> 00:08:10,087 ~ yeah, so the the question here is whether this tracking method they use, 141 00:08:10,087 --> 00:08:14,492 follow the beeping drum, ~ is a search under the Fourth Amendment. 142 00:08:13,862 --> 00:08:14,862 Right. 143 00:08:15,112 --> 00:08:18,293 And the court says no, that's a unanimous decision. 144 00:08:18,293 --> 00:08:22,543 Reinquist actually wrote the ~ the majority opinion, 145 00:08:22,543 --> 00:08:26,916 or I guess unanimous opinion, and the line that gets quoted for the next forty years 146 00:08:26,916 --> 00:08:32,488 is basically a person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares have 147 00:08:32,488 --> 00:08:37,078 no reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements from one place to another. 148 00:08:38,282 --> 00:08:39,918 Because literally anybody could have watched, 149 00:08:39,918 --> 00:08:41,956 right? If somebody just drove along behind the truck, 150 00:08:41,956 --> 00:08:44,255 they could they have were free to do that on Pelic Roads. 151 00:08:43,578 --> 00:08:44,578 Yes, 152 00:08:44,780 --> 00:08:48,423 anyone could have watched, which is the logic that they're using here, 153 00:08:48,423 --> 00:08:49,924 which made sense in that time. 154 00:08:49,924 --> 00:08:54,808 The police could have tailed him with an unmarked car and with enough patience. 155 00:08:54,808 --> 00:08:57,130 The beeper just made it cheaper. 156 00:08:57,880 --> 00:09:01,388 Okay, I want to complicate that because I think the way that this case usually gets 157 00:09:01,388 --> 00:09:03,332 told actually lets it off a little too easy. 158 00:09:03,913 --> 00:09:04,913 Go ahead. 159 00:09:05,414 --> 00:09:06,815 So everyone quotes the holding, 160 00:09:06,815 --> 00:09:08,895 almost no one quotes the caveat. 161 00:09:08,895 --> 00:09:13,277 The court knew, in the opinion they address exactly the objection we're making 162 00:09:13,277 --> 00:09:15,938 today. The government's lawyer basically says, 163 00:09:15,938 --> 00:09:18,639 Don't worry, this is one drum and one trip, 164 00:09:18,639 --> 00:09:21,320 and the court writes, and I'm paraphrasing closely here, 165 00:09:21,320 --> 00:09:27,412 if such dragnet type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should 166 00:09:27,412 --> 00:09:30,624 eventually occur, there will be a there will be time enough then 167 00:09:30,624 --> 00:09:33,825 to determine whether the different constitutional principles may be applicable. 168 00:09:34,994 --> 00:09:37,027 There will be time enough then. 169 00:09:38,253 --> 00:09:41,464 Right. So they're basically saying if if this becomes out of control, 170 00:09:41,464 --> 00:09:46,396 there will be time for us to to go in and observe and and craft new laws based 171 00:09:46,396 --> 00:09:47,896 on different constitutional principles. 172 00:09:47,896 --> 00:09:50,757 So then they put a bookmark bookmark there, 173 00:09:50,757 --> 00:09:54,119 and in nineteen eighty three the Supreme Court of the United States said, 174 00:09:54,119 --> 00:09:56,589 We can imagine a version of this that's a dragnet, 175 00:09:56,589 --> 00:09:57,930 and when that shows up we'll deal with it. 176 00:09:59,346 --> 00:10:01,433 And here's what happened to the bookmark. 177 00:10:01,433 --> 00:10:04,152 It essentially got used like a permission slip. 178 00:10:05,335 --> 00:10:07,828 Right. That's the that's the key. 179 00:10:07,828 --> 00:10:09,831 Every ALPR program in America, 180 00:10:09,831 --> 00:10:12,354 when it gets sued, cites knots. 181 00:10:12,354 --> 00:10:16,089 Not the caveat. The holding. You were on a public road. 182 00:10:16,089 --> 00:10:17,089 Anybody could have seen you. 183 00:10:18,056 --> 00:10:22,692 And that's kind of the the rotten core of anyone could have seen you. 184 00:10:22,692 --> 00:10:28,621 It's that it treats observation and recording as the same thing. 185 00:10:30,094 --> 00:10:31,531 They're not remotely the same thing. 186 00:10:32,165 --> 00:10:35,107 No. The neighbor if i if you have example, 187 00:10:35,107 --> 00:10:39,415 a neighbor sees your car like pulling out of the driveway is an event. 188 00:10:39,415 --> 00:10:42,417 I mean, it happens and then it's gone more or less. 189 00:10:42,417 --> 00:10:45,999 It's filtered through one unreliable human memory. 190 00:10:45,999 --> 00:10:49,281 A plate read is a record. 191 00:10:49,281 --> 00:10:51,973 It's timestamped, it's geolocated, 192 00:10:51,973 --> 00:10:55,096 it's indexed, it's queryable, it's copyable, 193 00:10:55,096 --> 00:10:56,757 it's pasteable, it's sellable, 194 00:10:56,757 --> 00:10:59,959 and it does not decay, meaning it's durable. 195 00:11:01,266 --> 00:11:04,740 And it's retroactive. That's the pri the piece that I don't think Knott's could have 196 00:11:04,740 --> 00:11:06,683 imagined, even with the caveat. 197 00:11:06,683 --> 00:11:09,667 In nineteen eighty three, to surveil someone you had to decide 198 00:11:09,667 --> 00:11:12,610 to surveil them first. The suspicion came first, 199 00:11:12,610 --> 00:11:13,610 then the data. 200 00:11:14,242 --> 00:11:16,401 But we're in a an AI world now. 201 00:11:16,401 --> 00:11:19,935 This is the data coming first. 202 00:11:21,151 --> 00:11:23,012 Some would say a brave new AI world. 203 00:11:23,012 --> 00:11:25,634 the the data comes years first, 204 00:11:25,634 --> 00:11:27,206 right? So you can go look in the backlogs. 205 00:11:27,206 --> 00:11:29,247 It's like being able to go look somebody up at the library, 206 00:11:29,247 --> 00:11:32,359 you know, years after something happened by looking at the new old newspapers. 207 00:11:32,359 --> 00:11:36,503 But but way worse. So somebody becomes interesting to the state, 208 00:11:36,503 --> 00:11:37,994 imagine in twenty twenty six, right? 209 00:11:37,994 --> 00:11:41,176 As we sit here today, someone suspects police officer suspects someone 210 00:11:41,176 --> 00:11:44,208 of committing a crime. And the state can go read where their car 211 00:11:44,208 --> 00:11:45,639 was in twenty twenty three. 212 00:11:46,568 --> 00:11:48,806 Nobody made a decision about that person in twenty twenty three. 213 00:11:48,806 --> 00:11:50,713 There was no decision. There was a camera, 214 00:11:50,713 --> 00:11:51,713 and that's it. 215 00:11:52,482 --> 00:11:54,834 So essentially it's suspicion in reverse. 216 00:11:56,007 --> 00:11:58,949 Right, which is a different kind of power than following a drum of chloroform. 217 00:11:59,841 --> 00:12:05,477 Now, let me lay this second piece of foundation because knots is the legal half. 218 00:12:05,477 --> 00:12:10,782 There's also a doctrinal half that's even more load bearing, 219 00:12:10,782 --> 00:12:14,056 and it's older, nineteen seventy nine. 220 00:12:14,806 --> 00:12:16,533 Smith versus Maryland, the pen register. 221 00:12:17,360 --> 00:12:22,856 Pen register. Baltimore. A woman named Patricia McDonough gets robbed 222 00:12:23,416 --> 00:12:25,799 and then starts getting threatening phone calls. 223 00:12:25,799 --> 00:12:29,302 Police suspect a man named Michael Lee Smith. 224 00:12:29,302 --> 00:12:33,876 So without a warrant, they get the phone company to install a very small device that 225 00:12:33,876 --> 00:12:38,290 records every single number that Michael Lee Smith would dial. 226 00:12:38,290 --> 00:12:40,951 Not the conversations, just the telephone number. 227 00:12:41,701 --> 00:12:43,484 And the court says the numbers aren't his. 228 00:12:44,523 --> 00:12:48,475 The court says he voluntarily conveyed that information to a third party, 229 00:12:48,475 --> 00:12:53,318 the phone company, and therefore he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in it. 230 00:12:53,318 --> 00:12:57,181 Blackman writes it, and that's the third party doctrine. 231 00:12:57,931 --> 00:13:00,264 And that is the single most important sentence in the history 232 00:13:00,264 --> 00:13:01,896 of American surveillance capitalism, 233 00:13:01,896 --> 00:13:04,269 and it was written about rotary phone. 234 00:13:04,869 --> 00:13:05,869 Tell 'My. 235 00:13:06,679 --> 00:13:09,783 Because it means the way you launder a search is you put a company in the middle. 236 00:13:09,783 --> 00:13:11,335 If the government collects it, 237 00:13:11,335 --> 00:13:12,707 that's a search and you have rights. 238 00:13:12,707 --> 00:13:15,240 If a company collects it and the government subscribes, 239 00:13:15,240 --> 00:13:17,844 that's a purchase and you have a customer service line. 240 00:13:18,831 --> 00:13:23,986 Which is exactly structurally exactly what Learn 241 00:13:24,288 --> 00:13:26,674 is and what flock is. 242 00:13:28,138 --> 00:13:32,201 Right. Schaumburg doesn't hand four hundred agencies a hard drive. 243 00:13:32,201 --> 00:13:35,103 Schaumburg checks a box in a vendor's platform. 244 00:13:35,103 --> 00:13:36,844 The vendor holds the the data. 245 00:13:36,844 --> 00:13:41,067 The vendor runs the network. The vendor decides what a share is, 246 00:13:41,067 --> 00:13:44,699 and the constitutional question gets answered by a terms of service agreement. 247 00:13:45,449 --> 00:13:48,958 Okay, third part. The actual technology itself, 248 00:13:48,958 --> 00:13:53,169 which is not American and did not start with a crime. 249 00:13:54,224 --> 00:13:55,813 This is actually my favorite part of the history, 250 00:13:55,813 --> 00:13:56,813 honestly. 251 00:13:57,278 --> 00:14:00,009 In Britain in the mid nineteen seventies, 252 00:14:00,009 --> 00:14:05,122 the home office had a research shop they called the Police Scientific Development 253 00:14:05,122 --> 00:14:10,374 Branch. And around sorry, I have to laugh at the names of European agencies, 254 00:14:10,374 --> 00:14:12,785 they just sound so I don't know, 255 00:14:12,785 --> 00:14:15,747 bland, like they're food. Anyway, 256 00:14:15,747 --> 00:14:21,129 around nineteen seventy six, they built the first working automatic number plate 257 00:14:21,129 --> 00:14:22,800 recognition prototype. 258 00:14:23,679 --> 00:14:27,558 And the first arrest off of it comes in the early eighties on a stolen car. 259 00:14:29,006 --> 00:14:32,164 And then it sits there because it's expensive and it barely even works. 260 00:14:32,818 --> 00:14:35,251 It it barely works. Bad cameras, 261 00:14:35,251 --> 00:14:38,995 bad lighting, bad optical character recognition or OCR, 262 00:14:38,995 --> 00:14:42,919 the tech side of it. For for about fifteen years, 263 00:14:42,919 --> 00:14:46,393 this is just sort of like a lab curiosity, 264 00:14:46,393 --> 00:14:50,147 something that's really cool, but like there's not really a purpose 265 00:14:50,147 --> 00:14:52,829 for because it's too expensive to upkeep and maintain, 266 00:14:52,829 --> 00:14:54,201 and it's not very correct. 267 00:14:54,951 --> 00:14:57,622 And then april twenty fourth, nineteen ninety three. 268 00:14:57,622 --> 00:15:03,045 Bishop's Gate The IRA detonates a truck bomb in the city of London, 269 00:15:03,045 --> 00:15:05,867 enormous damage, one person killed, 270 00:15:05,867 --> 00:15:07,668 a whole financial district shredded. 271 00:15:08,844 --> 00:15:11,821 And the response is the ring of steel. 272 00:15:12,756 --> 00:15:14,366 There's your cool name. It doesn't go to the agencies, 273 00:15:14,366 --> 00:15:15,367 it goes to their their 274 00:15:14,657 --> 00:15:15,657 It does. 275 00:15:15,367 --> 00:15:16,817 actions, their their missions. 276 00:15:16,817 --> 00:15:21,499 The Ring of Steel. They narrow the roads into the city of London to 277 00:15:21,499 --> 00:15:25,660 a handful of entry points. And they put number plate cameras on every one. 278 00:15:25,660 --> 00:15:29,601 Counterterrorism. Explicitly. That is the sale pitch, 279 00:15:29,601 --> 00:15:31,702 sales pitch, and that is the mandate. 280 00:15:31,702 --> 00:15:34,723 That is the justification. We're stopping bombs. 281 00:15:35,885 --> 00:15:37,665 And what is that infrastructure used for now? 282 00:15:39,143 --> 00:15:42,111 The congestion charge, traffic fines, 283 00:15:42,111 --> 00:15:44,057 low emission zone enforcement, 284 00:15:44,057 --> 00:15:46,093 ordinary policing, insurance checks. 285 00:15:47,053 --> 00:15:52,248 So roughly a decade from ~ we're just trying to prevent terrorist bombings 286 00:15:52,509 --> 00:15:54,836 to that'll be eleven pounds fifty. 287 00:15:56,080 --> 00:15:58,683 And I don't say that because congestion pricing is evil. 288 00:15:58,683 --> 00:16:02,948 I say it because it's the clearest documented case in the world 289 00:16:02,948 --> 00:16:04,830 of what actually happens to a camera network. 290 00:16:04,830 --> 00:16:06,863 The justification is disposable. 291 00:16:06,863 --> 00:16:08,505 The cameras, however, are permanent. 292 00:16:09,568 --> 00:16:13,527 The justification is disposable and we're seeing it now that 293 00:16:13,527 --> 00:16:15,050 the cameras are permanent. 294 00:16:16,209 --> 00:16:18,843 And it's every single time. And here's the broader read on this. 295 00:16:18,843 --> 00:16:22,350 This is where I'd push back on how we usually frame these episodes. 296 00:16:22,350 --> 00:16:25,084 We tend to tell the story as good intentions, 297 00:16:25,084 --> 00:16:28,520 then corruption, somebody built the tool for X and bad people came along 298 00:16:28,520 --> 00:16:29,520 and used it for Y. 299 00:16:30,050 --> 00:16:31,229 But we don't buy that, do we, Will? 300 00:16:32,155 --> 00:16:34,778 Not this time, because the tool doesn't change. 301 00:16:34,778 --> 00:16:37,872 There's no version of a plate reader network that reads plates for 302 00:16:37,872 --> 00:16:39,484 the good reasons and not the bad ones. 303 00:16:39,484 --> 00:16:41,947 The reader reads. Reader's gonna read, 304 00:16:41,947 --> 00:16:46,242 as Swifty might put it. Everything after that is policy and policy is just weather. 305 00:16:46,880 --> 00:16:48,465 Policy is weather. That's good. 306 00:16:49,872 --> 00:16:51,853 Thanks. Policy changes with an election. 307 00:16:51,853 --> 00:16:53,594 A vendor update, a new sheriff. 308 00:16:53,594 --> 00:16:55,134 There's a new sheriff in town. 309 00:16:55,134 --> 00:16:58,025 A pilot program, nobody told the CAO about. 310 00:16:58,025 --> 00:17:00,137 The camera, however, doesn't change. 311 00:17:00,137 --> 00:17:02,558 So when we say a system was misused, 312 00:17:02,558 --> 00:17:06,380 what we usually mean is it was used by someone who didn't anticipate 313 00:17:06,740 --> 00:17:08,441 for a purpose we didn't authorize, 314 00:17:08,441 --> 00:17:10,702 and the system had no way to tell the difference. 315 00:17:10,702 --> 00:17:14,704 That's this is not misuse. This is the design working in this case. 316 00:17:15,433 --> 00:17:19,660 Which brings us to the year two thousand two thousand two thousand 317 00:17:19,269 --> 00:17:20,269 The future. 318 00:17:20,662 --> 00:17:25,790 The future. And I want to say the name of the American version of the Ring of Steel, 319 00:17:25,790 --> 00:17:28,666 because it's specific and it's also here in the notes, 320 00:17:28,666 --> 00:17:29,666 which is kinda fun. 321 00:17:30,267 --> 00:17:34,175 Is a corporate sponsored and and has a cool name like McDonald's Freedom Ring 322 00:17:34,175 --> 00:17:35,175 of Steel. 323 00:17:34,877 --> 00:17:35,877 You wish. 324 00:17:37,179 --> 00:17:38,262 Tell us about Tamar Clayton. 325 00:17:38,759 --> 00:17:41,560 Yeah. Tamara Clayton is a postal worker, 326 00:17:41,560 --> 00:17:46,562 and she was shot to death on Interstate fifty seven near Chicago in twenty nineteen. 327 00:17:46,562 --> 00:17:53,085 Somebody fired into her car on a regular expressway during the commute and she died. 328 00:17:53,085 --> 00:17:58,517 And it was one of a run of expressway shootings that had been terrifying people 329 00:17:58,517 --> 00:17:59,888 in Cook County for years. 330 00:18:01,106 --> 00:18:04,827 I remember all those sniper cases and or like random killing cases. 331 00:18:04,827 --> 00:18:08,648 But understandably Miss Clayton's family wanted something done. 332 00:18:08,648 --> 00:18:10,579 I want to be careful here, Joshua, 333 00:18:10,579 --> 00:18:14,170 because it would be really easy to talk about the Tamara Clayton Expressway camera 334 00:18:14,170 --> 00:18:17,171 act like it was a pretext, and it wasn't a pretext. 335 00:18:17,171 --> 00:18:19,822 Her death was real, the fear was real, 336 00:18:19,822 --> 00:18:23,073 and the people who pushed that bill were not lying about wanting to catch 337 00:18:23,073 --> 00:18:25,274 the person who shot a mail carrier on her way to work. 338 00:18:26,060 --> 00:18:27,496 No, I I agree with that completely. 339 00:18:28,680 --> 00:18:32,512 But the bill that carries her name put roughly three hundred plate readers 340 00:18:32,932 --> 00:18:36,493 on Chicago Area Expressways. And then in twenty twenty two, 341 00:18:36,493 --> 00:18:38,774 that authority expanded beyond Cook County, 342 00:18:38,774 --> 00:18:42,326 and what a grieving family asked for was justice for one woman and what 343 00:18:42,326 --> 00:18:45,657 the state built was a permanent record of every commute in the region. 344 00:18:46,407 --> 00:18:49,700 Like, you know, gumbo in South Louisiana, 345 00:18:49,700 --> 00:18:51,939 that's the hyperlocal 346 00:18:50,118 --> 00:18:51,457 Hmm. Tell me about it. 347 00:18:51,939 --> 00:18:52,939 pitch. 348 00:18:53,490 --> 00:18:55,811 Hyperlocal, right? Catch a car thief. 349 00:18:55,811 --> 00:18:58,483 Find a missing kid. Like Amber Alerts, 350 00:18:58,483 --> 00:19:01,054 right? Avenge a murdered pro postal worker. 351 00:19:01,054 --> 00:19:04,256 And every one of those pitches is emotionally unanswerable. 352 00:19:04,256 --> 00:19:08,188 And every one of them buys infrastructure that outlives the argument by decades. 353 00:19:09,128 --> 00:19:10,800 And nobody voted on the second part. 354 00:19:11,824 --> 00:19:13,205 Nobody ever votes on the second part, 355 00:19:13,205 --> 00:19:16,287 do they? There isn't a ballot line that says do you approve 356 00:19:16,287 --> 00:19:19,339 of three hundred expressway cameras and also in four years would you like 357 00:19:19,339 --> 00:19:21,711 a railroad police department to be able to search them? 358 00:19:22,932 --> 00:19:24,855 Which is where we are now in twenty twenty six. 359 00:19:24,855 --> 00:19:30,034 Welcome. So let's do the money part because the money kind of explains the behavior. 360 00:19:30,969 --> 00:19:33,943 Always does. He who has the gold makes the rules. 361 00:19:32,788 --> 00:19:33,788 Flox 362 00:19:34,459 --> 00:19:39,041 Exactly. Flox Safety, which was founded in twenty seventeen in Atlanta 363 00:19:39,481 --> 00:19:41,682 by Garrett Langley, no relation, 364 00:19:41,274 --> 00:19:42,274 No relation. 365 00:19:42,383 --> 00:19:45,840 and Matt Fury. and the founding story is is kind of a good story. 366 00:19:45,840 --> 00:19:47,776 It says that kind of a compliment, 367 00:19:47,776 --> 00:19:50,467 I guess you could say, to their their marketing department. 368 00:19:50,467 --> 00:19:51,467 but 369 00:19:51,877 --> 00:19:53,778 Langley prop had property stolen, 370 00:19:53,778 --> 00:19:56,370 right? Police couldn't solve it because there was no evidence, 371 00:19:56,370 --> 00:20:01,054 and he thought, Well, what if there were cameras that read license plates 372 00:20:01,054 --> 00:20:02,275 and they were actually cheap? 373 00:20:03,025 --> 00:20:05,018 And crucially, who did he sell them to first? 374 00:20:05,965 --> 00:20:07,998 Yeah. The worst people in the world, 375 00:20:07,998 --> 00:20:10,863 HOA, Homeowners Associations. 376 00:20:12,093 --> 00:20:14,220 Homeowners associations, not the police. 377 00:20:14,220 --> 00:20:17,371 That's the thing people miss and it's the most important detail 378 00:20:17,371 --> 00:20:18,917 or business detail in the whole company. 379 00:20:19,555 --> 00:20:20,936 Why don't you explain your views on that? 380 00:20:22,247 --> 00:20:25,409 Well, as you mentioned, HOAs ~ or as we've alluded to, 381 00:20:25,409 --> 00:20:27,641 HOAs have no due process obligations, 382 00:20:27,641 --> 00:20:32,264 right? Constitutional rights are protecting individuals and citizens from the state, 383 00:20:32,264 --> 00:20:33,920 but there's no protection from your HOA, 384 00:20:33,920 --> 00:20:35,446 as you'll find out if you ever end up in one. 385 00:20:35,446 --> 00:20:38,348 there's no city council, no public comment period, 386 00:20:38,348 --> 00:20:41,371 no procurement code, no records act in most states, 387 00:20:41,371 --> 00:20:45,694 no constitutional constraint, because it's a basically a private club that owns some 388 00:20:45,694 --> 00:20:46,694 pavement. 389 00:20:47,022 --> 00:20:49,345 So if you want to put a surveillance camera on a residential street 390 00:20:49,345 --> 00:20:51,888 in America with zero democratic friction friction, 391 00:20:51,888 --> 00:20:55,402 you don't lobby a city, you sell to nine people at a clubhouse meeting 392 00:20:55,402 --> 00:20:57,044 who are worried about packages being stolen. 393 00:20:58,128 --> 00:21:02,596 Yes. And then the camera exists. 394 00:21:03,566 --> 00:21:05,918 And then it exists. And hey, it's already pointed at the road. 395 00:21:05,918 --> 00:21:09,531 And the police department can just ask or subscribe. 396 00:21:09,531 --> 00:21:12,724 The hard part of building a surveillance network is not the technology, 397 00:21:12,724 --> 00:21:16,427 it's the permission. And Flock's actual innovation was discovering that they could 398 00:21:16,427 --> 00:21:17,768 route around permission entirely. 399 00:21:18,748 --> 00:21:20,773 That is actually the entire business model. 400 00:21:20,773 --> 00:21:24,887 Not cameras, it's the arbitrage of permissions. 401 00:21:26,125 --> 00:21:28,508 Permission arbitrage. That's exciting sounding. 402 00:21:28,508 --> 00:21:29,508 And 403 00:21:28,603 --> 00:21:29,603 Ha ha ha. 404 00:21:29,229 --> 00:21:30,650 investors understood it perfectly, 405 00:21:30,650 --> 00:21:32,773 which is why in September of twenty twenty five, 406 00:21:32,773 --> 00:21:37,428 they raised two hundred and seventy five million dollars at a seven 407 00:21:37,428 --> 00:21:40,742 and a half billion blah blah blah billion dollar evaluation 408 00:21:41,243 --> 00:21:42,785 led by Andreessen Horowitz. 409 00:21:43,360 --> 00:21:49,413 Our favorite favorite dark money guru Seven and a half Bubillion will steal 410 00:21:49,413 --> 00:21:50,876 in my my ba bees. 411 00:21:51,679 --> 00:21:54,062 Sorry, I didn't realize you had a registered trademark on that. 412 00:21:53,954 --> 00:21:54,954 I do. 413 00:21:55,764 --> 00:21:59,829 For a company that makes a small solar camera that reads letters and numbers, 414 00:21:59,829 --> 00:22:01,902 that valuation is not about optics, 415 00:22:01,902 --> 00:22:04,015 let me tell you. That's a valuation on a network. 416 00:22:05,027 --> 00:22:10,594 Which is the right answer here and their their competition is kind 417 00:22:10,594 --> 00:22:13,156 of the incumbent Motorola Solutions, 418 00:22:13,156 --> 00:22:17,661 which bought Video as a Service International Holdings or VAAS parents 419 00:22:17,661 --> 00:22:23,037 of Vigilant Solutions in twenty twenty one for four hundred and forty five million 420 00:22:23,037 --> 00:22:24,037 dollars. 421 00:22:24,876 --> 00:22:27,009 And vigilant is the one that matters for Schomberg. 422 00:22:28,178 --> 00:22:32,431 Yes, Vigilant is Learn. That's the actual platform. 423 00:22:32,431 --> 00:22:35,994 It's subscription-based, agency to agency data sharing, 424 00:22:35,994 --> 00:22:40,957 and Vigilant had been in the business a long time before Flock ever existed. 425 00:22:40,957 --> 00:22:45,801 They'd built up commercial plate databases from repo companies, 426 00:22:45,801 --> 00:22:48,403 towing companies, private cameras, 427 00:22:48,403 --> 00:22:52,105 which means that the story that actually brought us here, 428 00:22:52,105 --> 00:22:54,327 the one of the Schaumburg guy from Illinois, 429 00:22:54,327 --> 00:22:55,588 isn't really 430 00:22:56,048 --> 00:22:58,873 Even the shiny new venture backed thing. 431 00:23:00,154 --> 00:23:01,409 It's really the boring old thing. 432 00:23:02,489 --> 00:23:08,142 It's the boring old thing that a Fortune five hundred defense adjacent radio company 433 00:23:08,482 --> 00:23:12,434 bought for four hundred forty five million dollars and then integrated into 434 00:23:12,434 --> 00:23:16,927 a product suite that already sells to basically every police department 435 00:23:16,927 --> 00:23:17,927 in the country. 436 00:23:18,257 --> 00:23:21,434 And that's why I keep saying that the four hundred number is not a 437 00:23:21,434 --> 00:23:24,851 cr a scandal about Schomberg. Four hundred is what the product does. 438 00:23:24,851 --> 00:23:27,217 That's the feature. That's what you're buying when you buy in. 439 00:23:27,979 --> 00:23:30,341 Right. And if you called vigilant and said, 440 00:23:30,341 --> 00:23:32,493 look, I I want to be in the network, 441 00:23:32,493 --> 00:23:36,046 but only share with my three neighboring towns, 442 00:23:36,046 --> 00:23:38,229 you could actually probably do that. 443 00:23:38,229 --> 00:23:43,263 And then you'd have paid the same money for one four hundredth 444 00:23:43,263 --> 00:23:44,765 of the value proposition. 445 00:23:46,195 --> 00:23:49,037 So your incentive gradient runs in entirely in one direction, 446 00:23:49,037 --> 00:23:50,585 always towards more sharing. 447 00:23:51,697 --> 00:23:56,021 Always towards more sharing. Nobody's compensation is actually tied 448 00:23:56,021 --> 00:23:59,665 to how few agencies can search a person's name. 449 00:24:00,976 --> 00:24:03,319 Okay, here's my question for the proverbial room, 450 00:24:03,319 --> 00:24:06,163 and I'll answer it, because I think the answer's uncomfortable. 451 00:24:06,163 --> 00:24:09,928 Why does the sharing keep happening after everyone knows it's a problem? 452 00:24:09,928 --> 00:24:11,840 Because that's the actual mystery, 453 00:24:11,840 --> 00:24:13,813 right? It's not twenty nineteen anymore. 454 00:24:13,813 --> 00:24:16,356 Everybody in Illinois government has read these headlines. 455 00:24:17,333 --> 00:24:18,333 Read it, King. 456 00:24:19,156 --> 00:24:22,589 It keeps happening because the procurement layer and the accountability layer 457 00:24:22,589 --> 00:24:25,161 are in different buildings, on different clocks, 458 00:24:25,161 --> 00:24:26,972 with different constituencies, 459 00:24:26,972 --> 00:24:28,484 and only one of them has a budget line. 460 00:24:29,195 --> 00:24:30,195 Say more. 461 00:24:30,412 --> 00:24:32,234 Cook County, fall twenty twenty two. 462 00:24:32,234 --> 00:24:35,599 Sheriff Tom Dart's office signs a contract with Flock, 463 00:24:35,599 --> 00:24:38,703 twenty-five plate readers plus the search software, 464 00:24:38,703 --> 00:24:40,625 seventy-five thousand dollars. 465 00:24:40,625 --> 00:24:44,029 And the contract is not competitively competitively bid, 466 00:24:44,029 --> 00:24:45,862 it's an emergency procurement. 467 00:24:46,744 --> 00:24:47,744 It's an emergency. 468 00:24:48,222 --> 00:24:51,176 Emergency, emergency, right? that's what emergency is supposed to be. 469 00:24:51,176 --> 00:24:53,619 But really that's a legal category that exists, 470 00:24:53,619 --> 00:24:57,243 so when a water main breaks, you don't have to run a ninety day RFP. 471 00:24:57,243 --> 00:25:00,938 It's not supposed to be how you acquire a permanent surveillance capability. 472 00:25:00,938 --> 00:25:02,620 Hello White House, are you listening? 473 00:25:02,947 --> 00:25:07,092 Right, or you know, like an emergency is not why we need to paint 474 00:25:07,212 --> 00:25:10,035 the reflecting pool with a pool liner. 475 00:25:10,035 --> 00:25:11,216 ~ 476 00:25:10,634 --> 00:25:11,634 Or build a ballroom. 477 00:25:11,917 --> 00:25:16,783 right. That is basically the point at which the contract expires. 478 00:25:17,533 --> 00:25:19,237 The contract expires the following year, 479 00:25:19,237 --> 00:25:21,142 and the office keeps using Flock anyway, 480 00:25:21,142 --> 00:25:23,479 for years, with no active contract. 481 00:25:24,811 --> 00:25:27,819 And you should sit with that for a second because think about what 482 00:25:27,940 --> 00:25:31,068 no contract means operationally. 483 00:25:31,068 --> 00:25:33,245 It's not just a paperwork gap. 484 00:25:34,299 --> 00:25:36,232 No, it's it's everything, it's free reign. 485 00:25:36,232 --> 00:25:38,817 A contract is where the retention period lives, 486 00:25:38,817 --> 00:25:40,620 it's where the data sharing limits live, 487 00:25:40,620 --> 00:25:42,404 it's where the audit rights live, 488 00:25:42,404 --> 00:25:44,427 it's where the deletion obligations live. 489 00:25:44,427 --> 00:25:47,313 It's where the you may not resell this clause lives. 490 00:25:48,490 --> 00:25:51,152 Yeah. And if you're not familiar with that, 491 00:25:51,152 --> 00:25:55,015 you know, being in the IT world we have things like legal holds where 492 00:25:55,015 --> 00:25:59,679 we have to hold retained data for a particular amount of time statutorily. 493 00:25:59,679 --> 00:26:01,601 But in these contract periods, 494 00:26:01,601 --> 00:26:03,983 if the contract is expired and they, 495 00:26:03,983 --> 00:26:09,227 you know, were required to hold data for five years or couldn't delete data before 496 00:26:09,227 --> 00:26:12,930 five years, now they can ostensibly, 497 00:26:12,930 --> 00:26:16,593 on the good side, delete data more than you know, 498 00:26:16,593 --> 00:26:17,714 before five years are up. 499 00:26:18,335 --> 00:26:20,446 But that's almost always what never happens. 500 00:26:20,446 --> 00:26:24,949 There it usually goes the other way where they never have to delete data at all. 501 00:26:24,949 --> 00:26:30,903 So now someone who went somewhere in twenty twenty five and they can look back 502 00:26:30,903 --> 00:26:35,866 to twenty eighteen and see who in twenty eighteen was in that particular area 503 00:26:35,866 --> 00:26:39,358 at that time, or if you've been going to that particular area since twenty eighteen. 504 00:26:39,358 --> 00:26:44,132 I don't say that to to sort of beleaguer ~ the point there. 505 00:26:44,132 --> 00:26:46,173 I just wanted to make sure that we were all on the 506 00:26:46,687 --> 00:26:48,349 the same understanding of what, 507 00:26:48,349 --> 00:26:51,912 you know, contractual obligations really hold us to. 508 00:26:51,912 --> 00:26:56,787 So a county of five million people was running a plate reader program where 509 00:26:56,787 --> 00:26:59,580 the answers to all of these questions were basically, 510 00:26:59,580 --> 00:27:01,931 whatever the vendor's default settings say. 511 00:27:02,681 --> 00:27:06,163 And here's the part that I find I genuinely find clarifying about American 512 00:27:06,163 --> 00:27:09,224 governance. May thirteenth, twenty twenty six, 513 00:27:09,224 --> 00:27:13,866 ~ my twentieth anniversary, officials from the Sheriff's Office, 514 00:27:13,866 --> 00:27:17,688 Douglas McLean among them, acknowledged to county commissioners that yes, 515 00:27:17,688 --> 00:27:19,649 they have been operating without an active contract. 516 00:27:20,422 --> 00:27:22,190 And the next day one later. 517 00:27:22,064 --> 00:27:23,064 The next day. 518 00:27:24,910 --> 00:27:26,503 Which is may fourteenth, twenty twenty six, 519 00:27:26,503 --> 00:27:29,818 if you're keeping track, the Cook County Board approves roughly 520 00:27:29,818 --> 00:27:32,332 one million dollars to nearly double the network, 521 00:27:32,332 --> 00:27:34,936 twenty five cameras to one hundred and twenty five. 522 00:27:35,485 --> 00:27:36,485 In one day. 523 00:27:37,081 --> 00:27:38,692 Right. So oops, we didn't have a contract. 524 00:27:38,692 --> 00:27:41,414 Well let's get that contract and blow it out of the water. 525 00:27:41,414 --> 00:27:46,278 Tree know just make it make it massively bigger in one day. 526 00:27:46,278 --> 00:27:49,240 The admission and the expansion are twenty four hours apart, 527 00:27:49,240 --> 00:27:52,222 and commissioners did push. Alma Anaya, 528 00:27:52,222 --> 00:27:55,064 Terra Stamps, Jessica Vasquez, 529 00:27:55,064 --> 00:27:58,837 ~ pressed on it, but there were real questions in the room and it passed anyway. 530 00:27:59,646 --> 00:28:01,292 And this is where I get sardonic. 531 00:28:01,292 --> 00:28:03,098 So please just let me get it out of my system. 532 00:28:04,005 --> 00:28:05,005 Please let him. 533 00:28:05,660 --> 00:28:09,383 In most functioning systems, discovering that a department 534 00:28:09,563 --> 00:28:15,029 ran an entire surveillance program for years with no contract would be 535 00:28:15,360 --> 00:28:19,773 at a minimum like a pause, maybe a reflection, 536 00:28:19,773 --> 00:28:22,876 maybe a let's find out what happened moment. 537 00:28:22,876 --> 00:28:26,620 Instead, this was a procurement event. 538 00:28:26,620 --> 00:28:31,204 The revelation created an agenda item to expand. 539 00:28:32,698 --> 00:28:35,479 Right, you can bet if they'd been if the vending machines have been given away free 540 00:28:35,479 --> 00:28:38,600 Snickers for five years or ten years that they would have done something about it. 541 00:28:38,600 --> 00:28:40,181 Somebody would have investigated something. 542 00:28:40,181 --> 00:28:42,842 because the problem, as framed internally, 543 00:28:42,842 --> 00:28:45,543 was never, ~ we surveiled people without authorization, 544 00:28:45,543 --> 00:28:49,565 the horror. The problem was we have an administrative deficiency. 545 00:28:49,565 --> 00:28:51,646 We need to get the contract to lock this down. 546 00:28:51,646 --> 00:28:53,286 by the way, let's expand it while we're at it. 547 00:28:53,286 --> 00:28:56,888 If you fix a deficiency by executing a proper contract, 548 00:28:56,888 --> 00:28:59,299 so while you're doing the paperwork anyway, 549 00:29:00,346 --> 00:29:01,944 Might well scale up by double. 550 00:29:02,807 --> 00:29:06,639 Yeah, might as well scale. And I want to name this pattern precisely because 551 00:29:06,639 --> 00:29:09,101 it recurs everywhere and it has no name that I know of. 552 00:29:09,101 --> 00:29:13,473 Exposure becomes procurement. You get caught and the remedy for getting caught 553 00:29:13,473 --> 00:29:16,255 is a bigger, better documented version of the thing you got caught doing. 554 00:29:17,286 --> 00:29:19,811 Which is our reform trap that we keep coming back to. 555 00:29:20,561 --> 00:29:24,678 That's the reform trap. Every audit finding generates a corrective action plan, 556 00:29:24,678 --> 00:29:27,283 and every corrective action plan is a contract is a contract. 557 00:29:27,283 --> 00:29:29,306 And every contract is a renewal. 558 00:29:29,306 --> 00:29:31,781 And a renewal is longer than what is replaced. 559 00:29:33,106 --> 00:29:37,145 Now let's do the guardrails because Illinois actually did build them, 560 00:29:37,145 --> 00:29:39,914 and I want to give them credit before we actually say what happened. 561 00:29:40,871 --> 00:29:41,871 Let's do it. 562 00:29:42,004 --> 00:29:48,290 twenty twenty three, Secretary of State Alexei Gianulis spearheads legislation. 563 00:29:48,290 --> 00:29:51,753 Senator Sarah Fiesenholt Figenholt, 564 00:29:51,753 --> 00:29:55,657 sorry, sponsors the bill, Representative Anne Williams in the House, 565 00:29:55,657 --> 00:29:57,729 advocates for including sorry, 566 00:29:57,729 --> 00:30:00,982 including Jennifer Welch pushing on the reproductive right side, 567 00:30:00,982 --> 00:30:03,044 and it gets Republican support. 568 00:30:03,044 --> 00:30:05,236 Senator Drill Jill Tracy. 569 00:30:06,018 --> 00:30:10,563 And the substance is you can't use Illinois ALPR data to track 570 00:30:10,563 --> 00:30:13,707 or penalize someone seeking abortion care, 571 00:30:13,707 --> 00:30:15,328 or as we call it, health care. 572 00:30:15,328 --> 00:30:20,034 And you cannot use it to criminalize someone's immigration status. 573 00:30:21,266 --> 00:30:23,002 Which is exactly the right law. 574 00:30:23,002 --> 00:30:25,120 That is a genuinely well targeted, 575 00:30:25,120 --> 00:30:26,736 well drafted, forward looking statute. 576 00:30:27,468 --> 00:30:30,138 It is. And on june twelfth, twenty twenty five, 577 00:30:30,138 --> 00:30:33,240 Gianulis announces what happened to it. 578 00:30:33,240 --> 00:30:37,461 Mount Prospect, Illinois. Its plate reader data was accessed 579 00:30:37,461 --> 00:30:40,813 by Texas authorities searching for a woman in connection with 580 00:30:40,813 --> 00:30:46,525 a self administered abortion. As part of a nationwide search across more than eighty 581 00:30:46,525 --> 00:30:51,627 three thousand cameras, and in the same review more than two hundred 582 00:30:51,627 --> 00:30:56,319 and sixty immigration related searches touching Illinois data. 583 00:30:57,069 --> 00:30:59,125 eighty three thousand cameras. 584 00:30:59,881 --> 00:31:03,353 Yeah. And G Newlis does what he can do, 585 00:31:03,353 --> 00:31:09,487 which in order which is order basically flock to block forty six 586 00:31:09,487 --> 00:31:13,460 out of state agencies and refer the matter to the Attorney General 587 00:31:13,460 --> 00:31:15,221 for possible criminal charges. 588 00:31:15,221 --> 00:31:17,412 Mount prospect denied wrongdoing. 589 00:31:18,700 --> 00:31:20,464 And they may sincerely believe that, 590 00:31:20,464 --> 00:31:24,375 which is the horror of it. Nobody in Mount Prospect has to say yes to Texas 591 00:31:24,375 --> 00:31:28,054 or had to say yes to Texas. Somebody had a setting configured in a certain way. 592 00:31:29,022 --> 00:31:31,474 And then a statewide audit. August twenty fifth, 593 00:31:31,474 --> 00:31:34,187 twenty twenty five, twelve agencies reviewed, 594 00:31:34,187 --> 00:31:37,540 and the finding is the one that I will never get over. 595 00:31:38,290 --> 00:31:40,186 Customs and border protection has entered the chat. 596 00:31:40,973 --> 00:31:45,781 CBP had access to Illinois plate reader cameras through a pilot program, 597 00:31:45,781 --> 00:31:49,567 and Flock leadership, per the audit and the reporting, 598 00:31:49,567 --> 00:31:53,043 was itself unaware that the pilot existed. 599 00:31:54,292 --> 00:31:56,949 Correction. Customs and border protection has been lurking in the chat 600 00:31:56,949 --> 00:32:00,559 the entire time. So let me just take that apart because I think people hear 601 00:32:00,559 --> 00:32:01,692 it and don't hold on to it. 602 00:32:02,605 --> 00:32:04,295 So please do hold on to it. 603 00:32:05,595 --> 00:32:08,617 A company valued at seven and a half billion dollars, 604 00:32:08,617 --> 00:32:13,120 no infringement there, whose entire product is a permission system, 605 00:32:13,120 --> 00:32:14,741 that is literally what they sell, 606 00:32:14,741 --> 00:32:17,003 who can see what, when, and under which rules, 607 00:32:17,003 --> 00:32:20,885 could not tell you which federal agencies were inside their permission system. 608 00:32:20,885 --> 00:32:24,968 So this is their one job, and they can't tell you who's in or who's out. 609 00:32:24,968 --> 00:32:28,691 The CEO, Garrett Langley, again no relation, 610 00:32:28,691 --> 00:32:33,424 then announces a hold on the CVP and Homeland Security Investigations pilots. 611 00:32:34,082 --> 00:32:36,377 After a state official told him that they even existed. 612 00:32:37,127 --> 00:32:39,705 The vendor actually found out from the regulator. 613 00:32:40,567 --> 00:32:42,371 Right. Talk about last to know. 614 00:32:42,371 --> 00:32:43,371 ~ 615 00:32:42,760 --> 00:32:43,760 Right. 616 00:32:43,233 --> 00:32:46,531 and that is not a bad apple. That's an organization above 617 00:32:46,531 --> 00:32:50,359 its own comprehension limit. It has grown past the ability of any person inside 618 00:32:50,359 --> 00:32:51,359 to know what it's doing. 619 00:32:51,975 --> 00:32:54,780 And two towns did the only thing that actually works. 620 00:32:55,530 --> 00:32:57,778 Evanston and Oak Park ended their flock contracts. 621 00:32:58,213 --> 00:32:59,213 They left. 622 00:32:59,407 --> 00:33:02,318 They left. No, we implemented a stricter policy. 623 00:33:02,318 --> 00:33:04,810 No we required two factor sign off. 624 00:33:04,810 --> 00:33:08,533 they turned it off. And I want it I want that on the table now before 625 00:33:08,533 --> 00:33:12,005 we go any further because it's the proof of concept for everything we argue 626 00:33:12,005 --> 00:33:13,436 in the back half of this episode. 627 00:33:13,436 --> 00:33:16,878 The exit is available. Tow other towns have taken it. 628 00:33:16,878 --> 00:33:19,180 Austin, Texas let its contract lapse. 629 00:33:19,180 --> 00:33:22,592 Norfolk, Virginia got sued over its network under the Fourth Amendment 630 00:33:22,592 --> 00:33:26,865 by drivers who said a citywide reader grid was ~ a warrantless research 631 00:33:26,865 --> 00:33:28,226 w warrantless search, excuse me. 632 00:33:28,936 --> 00:33:30,405 So the choice is real. 633 00:33:29,667 --> 00:33:30,667 Hmm. 634 00:33:31,639 --> 00:33:34,862 The choice is real and the choice is being made in both directions 635 00:33:35,302 --> 00:33:37,244 by cities that are looking at the same evidence. 636 00:33:37,244 --> 00:33:39,586 Oak Park read the audit and canceled. 637 00:33:39,586 --> 00:33:42,078 Cook County read the audit and bought a hundred more cameras. 638 00:33:42,828 --> 00:33:46,694 Oklahoma City just decided to renew their contract with flock cameras. 639 00:33:46,694 --> 00:33:51,442 These are all the same facts. They're two completely different conclusions, 640 00:33:51,442 --> 00:33:52,442 okay? 641 00:33:52,713 --> 00:33:55,100 And I want to start with a family in a parking lot in Aurora, 642 00:33:55,100 --> 00:33:58,540 Colorado, because this is the part of the argument that gets skipped when 643 00:33:58,540 --> 00:33:59,540 we talk about databases. 644 00:34:00,288 --> 00:34:01,288 August twenty twenty. 645 00:34:02,441 --> 00:34:04,262 August second, twenty twenty to be precise, 646 00:34:04,262 --> 00:34:08,124 a woman named Brittany Gilliam takes four girls out for the day, 647 00:34:08,124 --> 00:34:10,706 her daughter, her sister, and her two nieces, 648 00:34:10,706 --> 00:34:14,188 ages six, twelve, fourteen, and seventeen. 649 00:34:14,188 --> 00:34:17,590 They're in an SUV, they're going to get their nails done, 650 00:34:17,590 --> 00:34:21,083 the salon's closed, so they pull into a parking lot to figure out what 651 00:34:21,083 --> 00:34:22,083 to do instead. 652 00:34:22,774 --> 00:34:24,141 And then the plate reader hits. 653 00:34:25,141 --> 00:34:27,887 Plate reader hits. System flags the vehicle as stolen, 654 00:34:27,887 --> 00:34:32,367 except the stolen vehicle was a motorcycle from a different state with 655 00:34:32,367 --> 00:34:34,201 a plate that was similar, not identical. 656 00:34:35,224 --> 00:34:37,880 Wait a minute, so the machine was wrong? 657 00:34:37,880 --> 00:34:40,396 In the most boring way possible? 658 00:34:41,146 --> 00:34:43,107 Machine was wrong in the most boring way possible, 659 00:34:43,107 --> 00:34:44,457 and the most likely way possible. 660 00:34:44,457 --> 00:34:47,978 And then human beings executed on the machine's answer. 661 00:34:47,978 --> 00:34:50,319 Officers order everyone out of the car, 662 00:34:50,319 --> 00:34:54,681 guns drawn. They put children face down on the pavement of a parking lot 663 00:34:54,681 --> 00:34:56,501 on a summer afternoon and handcuff them. 664 00:34:56,501 --> 00:34:59,802 A six year old, a twelve year old. 665 00:34:59,802 --> 00:35:02,413 There's video. You can hear them screaming. 666 00:35:03,163 --> 00:35:05,336 The city did actually reach a settlement though. 667 00:35:06,497 --> 00:35:10,526 Right. The city settled for around one point nine million dollars years later 668 00:35:10,526 --> 00:35:14,555 in twenty twenty four. And I want to be very clear about the mechanism because 669 00:35:14,555 --> 00:35:16,681 the algorithm made a mistake is not quite it. 670 00:35:17,223 --> 00:35:18,223 Go for it. 671 00:35:18,903 --> 00:35:20,525 The algorithm produced a claim, 672 00:35:20,525 --> 00:35:22,847 and the claim arrived pre credentialed. 673 00:35:22,847 --> 00:35:25,930 When a plate reader tells an officer stolen vehicle, 674 00:35:25,930 --> 00:35:28,072 it does not arrive as a hypothesis. 675 00:35:28,072 --> 00:35:31,275 It arrives as a fact with a machine's authority behind it, 676 00:35:31,275 --> 00:35:35,501 and the officer's job becomes executing on a fact rather than investigating 677 00:35:35,501 --> 00:35:38,903 a hypothesis. That's what put the six year old in handcuffs, 678 00:35:38,903 --> 00:35:42,987 not a typo, a typo plus institutional deference to a typo. 679 00:35:44,464 --> 00:35:49,607 This is I hear this a lot when people talk about policing and the police in general. 680 00:35:49,607 --> 00:35:51,978 They'll say something along the lines of look, 681 00:35:51,978 --> 00:35:55,411 the job of the police is just to execute the law. 682 00:35:55,411 --> 00:35:58,683 It's just to enforce the law. 683 00:35:58,683 --> 00:36:01,355 And I've heard that so many, so many times as just that. 684 00:36:01,355 --> 00:36:03,456 It's their job to enforce the law. 685 00:36:03,456 --> 00:36:07,749 I agree. But in a normal scenario, 686 00:36:07,749 --> 00:36:12,682 their job of enforcing the law comes with a mandate from a human being. 687 00:36:13,432 --> 00:36:20,148 And that's why the data is just a lead is the softest lie in this whole industry. 688 00:36:21,524 --> 00:36:24,631 Right. In this case it's a lead with a gun behind it because that lead's gonna 689 00:36:24,631 --> 00:36:26,906 direct a police officer how to approach the situation. 690 00:36:27,656 --> 00:36:30,408 And for, you know, I guess their stockholders' wallets, 691 00:36:30,408 --> 00:36:35,672 it scales really well. That's the thing about error rates in a network 692 00:36:35,672 --> 00:36:37,574 of eighty three thousand cameras. 693 00:36:37,574 --> 00:36:41,297 A misread rate that sounds negligible, 694 00:36:41,297 --> 00:36:45,761 let's call it, I don't know, fractions of a percent across hundreds 695 00:36:45,761 --> 00:36:50,225 of millions of license plate reads is an enormous, 696 00:36:50,225 --> 00:36:54,028 absolute number of wrong answers every year. 697 00:36:54,028 --> 00:36:56,620 And each answer that 698 00:36:56,864 --> 00:37:01,853 That wrong answer is a stop and some percentages of of those stops are 699 00:37:01,853 --> 00:37:03,516 the worst day of someone's life. 700 00:37:04,266 --> 00:37:07,635 And the people who get those worst days are not randomly distributed. 701 00:37:08,048 --> 00:37:09,048 They are not. 702 00:37:09,804 --> 00:37:13,034 Okay, second case. And this one's the legal spine of the whole thing. 703 00:37:13,034 --> 00:37:15,743 Stephanie Scholl and Frank Bednars. 704 00:37:17,040 --> 00:37:19,075 Both live in Cook County and drive there. 705 00:37:19,787 --> 00:37:23,868 Two Cook County drivers, two people who drive on the Chicago Area Expressways, 706 00:37:23,868 --> 00:37:26,789 remember those, which is to say two people who commute. 707 00:37:26,789 --> 00:37:31,170 And in 2024, the Liberty Justice Center files suit on their behalf against 708 00:37:31,170 --> 00:37:34,831 the Illinois State Police. Shoal versus International or sorry, 709 00:37:34,831 --> 00:37:40,422 Illinois State Police. case number 124 CV O four four three five, 710 00:37:40,422 --> 00:37:41,773 Northern District of Illinois. 711 00:37:41,773 --> 00:37:46,234 Defendants include State Police Director Brendan Kelly and the case names Governor 712 00:37:46,234 --> 00:37:47,844 Pritzker and Attorney General. 713 00:37:48,048 --> 00:37:49,048 Quamiro. 714 00:37:49,402 --> 00:37:51,248 And the claim is Fourth Amendment. 715 00:37:51,248 --> 00:37:52,462 We we're protected by 716 00:37:52,066 --> 00:37:53,066 Right. 717 00:37:52,462 --> 00:37:53,462 the Fourth Amendment. 718 00:37:53,738 --> 00:37:56,802 From unreasonable searches. So the claim is that a network 719 00:37:56,802 --> 00:38:00,446 of expressway plate readers that records every driver indefinitely, 720 00:38:00,446 --> 00:38:03,050 without a warrant, without suspicion, 721 00:38:03,050 --> 00:38:06,354 is a search. This may sound like a radical conclusion, 722 00:38:06,354 --> 00:38:08,316 but it's not a search of shoal, 723 00:38:08,316 --> 00:38:10,589 a search of everyone continuously, 724 00:38:10,589 --> 00:38:11,589 including Shoal. 725 00:38:12,540 --> 00:38:16,348 And I want to flag who's bringing this because it matters politically. 726 00:38:17,710 --> 00:38:21,832 The Liberty Justice Center is a libertarian leaning public interest firm. 727 00:38:21,832 --> 00:38:24,460 This is not a progressive civil liberties campaign. 728 00:38:25,404 --> 00:38:27,615 It is not. This is not the ACLU. 729 00:38:27,615 --> 00:38:31,698 And in Norfolk, it was the Institute for Justice. 730 00:38:31,698 --> 00:38:38,002 And what that tells you is that mass plate surveillance is one of maybe four issues 731 00:38:38,002 --> 00:38:42,345 left in America where the coalition against it is genuinely 732 00:38:42,505 --> 00:38:48,438 and structurally bipartisan. Not in like a both sides have concerns op 733 00:38:48,438 --> 00:38:50,760 ed kind of way. In the same brief 734 00:38:51,610 --> 00:38:56,205 in the the like it gets signed by the same people who agree on nothing else kind 735 00:38:56,205 --> 00:38:57,205 of a way. 736 00:38:57,825 --> 00:39:02,041 Because being tracked by default offends two different American instincts at once. 737 00:39:02,041 --> 00:39:05,766 It offends the civil rights instinct about people about who gets policed, 738 00:39:05,766 --> 00:39:09,000 and it offends the government does not get to know where I am instinct. 739 00:39:09,750 --> 00:39:12,502 It I mean it offends me on a couple of more levels, 740 00:39:12,502 --> 00:39:16,936 but I but I will tell you that this is this is the one thing I feel like everybody 741 00:39:16,936 --> 00:39:19,548 can probably agree on right now right now, 742 00:39:19,548 --> 00:39:20,548 if anything. 743 00:39:19,699 --> 00:39:20,699 Exactly. 744 00:39:20,839 --> 00:39:23,190 Yeah. in March twenty twenty five, 745 00:39:23,190 --> 00:39:28,695 Judge Martha Packold issued an opinion that l lets the core standing theories 746 00:39:28,695 --> 00:39:30,506 survive dismissal. 747 00:39:31,751 --> 00:39:33,648 Which is a bigger deal than it sounds at first. 748 00:39:35,010 --> 00:39:37,992 It's a much bigger deal than it sounds because the the standing question, 749 00:39:37,992 --> 00:39:41,775 how are you injured if you don't know that anyone looked you up? 750 00:39:41,775 --> 00:39:45,879 is the trapdoor that these cases usually fall through. 751 00:39:45,879 --> 00:39:50,323 The state's argument in a hundred surveillance cases has been look, 752 00:39:50,323 --> 00:39:54,086 you can't prove you were harmed because the harm is secret, 753 00:39:54,086 --> 00:39:55,927 and because the harm is secret, 754 00:39:55,927 --> 00:39:59,360 you can't sue to find out. It's like this perfect loop. 755 00:40:00,110 --> 00:40:01,110 And it survived. 756 00:40:01,745 --> 00:40:06,154 It survived. So there is a live federal case in Illinois asking whether 757 00:40:06,154 --> 00:40:11,035 the thing Knotts bookmarked in nineteen eighty three has actually finally arrived. 758 00:40:12,335 --> 00:40:14,842 So are we at the event and there will be time enough then? 759 00:40:15,623 --> 00:40:17,877 Yeah, th th this is this is the then. 760 00:40:17,877 --> 00:40:19,310 This is the now that 761 00:40:18,446 --> 00:40:19,446 Then is now 762 00:40:19,310 --> 00:40:21,745 the socks the Scotus never thought would come. 763 00:40:21,745 --> 00:40:23,399 We're at then. 764 00:40:22,658 --> 00:40:23,658 Then is now. 765 00:40:23,439 --> 00:40:26,534 Let now let's go back now, let's go back to the man who did this with 766 00:40:26,534 --> 00:40:30,471 the laptop because Jason Hunyar's method is the most instructive thing 767 00:40:30,471 --> 00:40:32,294 in this episode, and I want to walk through it properly. 768 00:40:32,695 --> 00:40:33,695 Do it. 769 00:40:34,366 --> 00:40:36,949 He's in Dunwoody, Georgia, suburb of Atlanta, 770 00:40:36,949 --> 00:40:38,981 which side note is where Flock is headquartered, 771 00:40:38,981 --> 00:40:40,353 and I don't think that's coincidence. 772 00:40:40,353 --> 00:40:44,298 I think he's watching his own backyard and it took it taught him what to ask for. 773 00:40:45,016 --> 00:40:46,439 he didn't ask for just a policy. 774 00:40:47,024 --> 00:40:48,024 Right, this is the whole thing. 775 00:40:47,974 --> 00:40:50,317 He doesn't ask what is your license plate reader policy? 776 00:40:50,317 --> 00:40:54,001 Because every agency has a policy and every policy says the right words. 777 00:40:54,001 --> 00:40:56,724 He asks for the operational artifact, 778 00:40:56,724 --> 00:41:01,129 the data sharing report, the thing the system itself generates that lists 779 00:41:01,129 --> 00:41:02,129 who has access. 780 00:41:02,805 --> 00:41:05,979 Basically he wanted the the the system to confess on itself. 781 00:41:07,024 --> 00:41:08,816 Right. He wants and he wants the confession, 782 00:41:08,816 --> 00:41:10,157 the transcript of the confession, 783 00:41:10,157 --> 00:41:14,962 not the policy behind it. And Schomberg sends it because it's a public record 784 00:41:15,002 --> 00:41:18,375 and Illinois has a records act and it comes back with more than four hundred 785 00:41:18,375 --> 00:41:22,028 agencies on it. Four hundred agencies. 786 00:41:22,028 --> 00:41:23,980 Law enforcement and government, 787 00:41:23,980 --> 00:41:26,092 universities, railroad police, 788 00:41:26,092 --> 00:41:27,794 the state attorney general's office. 789 00:41:29,247 --> 00:41:33,903 I wanna pull on the railroad because ~ that's that's one that one's like 790 00:41:33,903 --> 00:41:35,015 the the tell of it all. 791 00:41:36,242 --> 00:41:37,242 Pull on it. 792 00:41:37,662 --> 00:41:40,343 So the railroad police in the United States, 793 00:41:40,343 --> 00:41:42,244 if you've not heard of them, they're very real. 794 00:41:42,244 --> 00:41:46,287 They're very real, strange legal creatures. 795 00:41:46,287 --> 00:41:51,369 ~ they they're private employees of a private corporation 796 00:41:51,670 --> 00:41:56,251 who hold sworn police powers, often across multiple states, 797 00:41:56,251 --> 00:41:57,892 because that's what railroads do, 798 00:41:57,892 --> 00:42:04,006 under very old statutes that date to the era when railroads basically were 799 00:42:04,006 --> 00:42:05,006 the government. 800 00:42:05,290 --> 00:42:06,878 in large parts of the country. 801 00:42:08,114 --> 00:42:09,616 And guess who's on the access list? 802 00:42:10,412 --> 00:42:14,424 They are on the access list, which means a private company's police force, 803 00:42:14,424 --> 00:42:19,857 a private police force, can search where a resident's car has been. 804 00:42:19,857 --> 00:42:24,920 And I would bet a considerable amount of money that not one person 805 00:42:25,172 --> 00:42:31,474 in Schaumburg at any public meeting ever has said the words and also the railroad. 806 00:42:32,947 --> 00:42:36,850 The the ghost of Cornelius Vanderbilt wasn't back there saying and the railroads 807 00:42:37,374 --> 00:42:40,124 Exactly. The thing is, nobody 808 00:42:39,723 --> 00:42:40,723 here's 809 00:42:40,124 --> 00:42:41,630 voted on any of that. 810 00:42:42,461 --> 00:42:44,653 Right, and here's what I keep coming back to about Hunyar. 811 00:42:44,653 --> 00:42:47,396 He has no jurisdiction. That's the point. 812 00:42:47,396 --> 00:42:51,060 He's a private citizen in Georgia who obtained the surveillance sharing records 813 00:42:51,060 --> 00:42:55,165 of a village in Illinois using nothing but the state's own transparency 814 00:42:55,165 --> 00:42:57,007 law and the willingness to send an email. 815 00:42:58,040 --> 00:43:00,417 So that borderlessness cuts both ways. 816 00:43:01,437 --> 00:43:05,031 It does. And that's the single most usable fact in this episode. 817 00:43:05,031 --> 00:43:07,374 They built a network with no borders. 818 00:43:07,374 --> 00:43:11,098 Fine. Records laws have no borders either in most states. 819 00:43:11,098 --> 00:43:12,810 You do not have to be a resident. 820 00:43:12,810 --> 00:43:14,121 You do not have to have standing. 821 00:43:14,121 --> 00:43:15,463 You do not have to explain why. 822 00:43:16,438 --> 00:43:21,415 And his stated position per the reporting is that these records belong 823 00:43:21,415 --> 00:43:22,415 to the public. 824 00:43:23,123 --> 00:43:25,826 They belong to the public and he keeps soliciting audit logs, 825 00:43:25,826 --> 00:43:27,407 which is the escalation, right? 826 00:43:27,407 --> 00:43:29,569 The sharing report tells you who can look, 827 00:43:29,569 --> 00:43:31,260 the audit log tells you who did. 828 00:43:32,256 --> 00:43:34,474 And nobody wants to hand over the audit log. 829 00:43:35,407 --> 00:43:37,932 Nobody wants to hand over the audit log because the audit log is where 830 00:43:37,932 --> 00:43:40,968 the reason field lives. And the reason field is where you find 831 00:43:40,968 --> 00:43:43,593 out that somebody searched a plate three hundred times and typed 832 00:43:43,593 --> 00:43:45,337 the word investigation every time. 833 00:43:46,442 --> 00:43:49,886 And that's the pattern I want to name across all three of these things. 834 00:43:49,886 --> 00:43:54,531 Gilliam, Shoal, and Bednar's Hunyar, 835 00:43:54,531 --> 00:43:59,146 is that in every single case the accountability came from outside 836 00:43:59,146 --> 00:44:03,581 the system after the fact at a private citizen's expense. 837 00:44:04,991 --> 00:44:07,186 family had to be traumatized and then bring a lawsuit. 838 00:44:08,411 --> 00:44:10,360 Two commuters had to find a law firm. 839 00:44:11,541 --> 00:44:13,972 A guy in Georgia had to file paperwork on his own time. 840 00:44:14,907 --> 00:44:17,719 There is no case here where the system caught itself. 841 00:44:17,719 --> 00:44:20,151 Not one. And I'm going to be clear about this. 842 00:44:20,151 --> 00:44:21,562 That's not a staffing problem. 843 00:44:21,562 --> 00:44:23,743 It doesn't mean that there's not enough people doing the job. 844 00:44:23,743 --> 00:44:28,026 There's no oversight body in America that is resourced 845 00:44:28,026 --> 00:44:33,460 to audit 83,000 cameras and 400 agencies 846 00:44:33,460 --> 00:44:39,295 per node in real time. That body does not exist and it's not going to be created. 847 00:44:40,045 --> 00:44:43,301 Which means the oversight we're promised is a fiction. 848 00:44:43,301 --> 00:44:46,857 And the oversight we actually get is hobbyists and litigation. 849 00:44:47,607 --> 00:44:49,148 So let me do the thing we said we'd do. 850 00:44:49,148 --> 00:44:52,911 Not surveillance is creepy, the enumerated case, 851 00:44:52,911 --> 00:44:54,752 why this is wrong specifically, 852 00:44:54,752 --> 00:44:57,414 and why the answer is elimination and not reform. 853 00:44:57,414 --> 00:44:59,005 I've got six things. 854 00:44:59,666 --> 00:45:00,666 Let's hear. 855 00:45:01,456 --> 00:45:05,388 One, it inverts the warrant. The entire architecture of the Fourth Amendment 856 00:45:05,388 --> 00:45:07,729 is that you establish cause and then you search, 857 00:45:07,729 --> 00:45:10,490 because you just don't get to go around randomly searching people. 858 00:45:10,490 --> 00:45:13,471 But a plate reader network searches everyone first, 859 00:45:13,471 --> 00:45:16,273 permanently, and then waits around for a reason. 860 00:45:16,273 --> 00:45:20,204 There's no version of reasonable suspicion that operates on a database that 861 00:45:20,204 --> 00:45:22,015 was built before any suspicion existed. 862 00:45:22,015 --> 00:45:26,257 You cannot bolt cause onto a system whose whole function is to precede the cause. 863 00:45:27,236 --> 00:45:28,236 Number two. 864 00:45:28,422 --> 00:45:31,824 two, it's a time machine, and consent can't be retroactive. 865 00:45:31,824 --> 00:45:35,106 Even if every voter in Schomburg voted yes in twenty nineteen, 866 00:45:35,106 --> 00:45:39,128 which they didn't, that vote could not authorize a twenty twenty six search 867 00:45:39,128 --> 00:45:43,680 of a twenty nineteen movement by a twenty twenty six agency operating under twenty 868 00:45:43,680 --> 00:45:47,592 twenty six politics. The abortion case proves this precisely. 869 00:45:47,592 --> 00:45:50,564 In twenty nineteen no one in Illinois was voting on whether Texas should 870 00:45:50,564 --> 00:45:52,435 be able to find someone who ended a pregnancy, 871 00:45:52,435 --> 00:45:55,277 because in twenty nineteen that was not the legal landscape. 872 00:45:55,277 --> 00:45:57,698 The law changed, the data didn't. 873 00:45:58,330 --> 00:46:00,483 Data just sat there and became newly dangerous. 874 00:46:01,460 --> 00:46:04,614 The data sat there and then became dangerous. 875 00:46:04,614 --> 00:46:05,850 That's the line here, folks. 876 00:46:06,600 --> 00:46:08,401 So number three, it's not a camera. 877 00:46:08,401 --> 00:46:12,002 It's a pattern engine. And this is where I think the public conversation 878 00:46:12,002 --> 00:46:13,363 is a decade behind the product. 879 00:46:13,363 --> 00:46:17,125 Nobody in this industry is selling did this plate pass this pole? 880 00:46:17,125 --> 00:46:20,326 They're selling vehicle characteristics when the plate is unreadable. 881 00:46:20,326 --> 00:46:22,467 They're selling convoy analysis, 882 00:46:22,467 --> 00:46:25,919 which cars travel together. They're selling visitation patterns, 883 00:46:25,919 --> 00:46:28,530 which car appeared at this location eleven times in a month. 884 00:46:28,530 --> 00:46:32,402 They're selling show me every vehicle that was near both of these places. 885 00:46:33,378 --> 00:46:35,154 Which is association mapping. 886 00:46:36,325 --> 00:46:37,636 Which is what they do for terrorists, 887 00:46:37,636 --> 00:46:39,126 right? It's association mapping, 888 00:46:39,126 --> 00:46:40,957 and if you ran it on a union drive, 889 00:46:40,957 --> 00:46:43,359 it would tell you exactly who attended the meeting. 890 00:46:43,359 --> 00:46:46,700 every car in the lot behind the hall on a Thursday night. 891 00:46:46,700 --> 00:46:49,362 And I want to say clearly, I'm describing a capability, 892 00:46:49,362 --> 00:46:51,183 not accusing a specific department. 893 00:46:51,183 --> 00:46:53,384 But the capability is the product. 894 00:46:53,384 --> 00:46:56,415 It's what you're buying. And this show is about labor, 895 00:46:56,415 --> 00:46:59,967 so let's be direct. The ability to enumerate everyone who showed up somewhere 896 00:46:59,967 --> 00:47:02,848 is the oldest anti organizing tool in American history. 897 00:47:02,848 --> 00:47:05,712 And we just automated it and put it on a poll outside of the warehouse. 898 00:47:06,847 --> 00:47:07,847 What about number four? 899 00:47:09,040 --> 00:47:11,892 four. Consent is laundered through geography. 900 00:47:11,892 --> 00:47:16,595 Your town votes, your town's vote cannot bind agency number three hundred eleven, 901 00:47:16,595 --> 00:47:20,398 so the Democratic Act, and that's the thing that's supposed to make this legitimate, 902 00:47:20,398 --> 00:47:23,520 has a scope of one node in a mesh of thousands. 903 00:47:23,520 --> 00:47:25,862 Meaning you're authorizing your town's node, 904 00:47:25,862 --> 00:47:27,944 but you can't affect what the other nodes are doing. 905 00:47:27,944 --> 00:47:30,445 It's not the democratic control is weak here, 906 00:47:30,445 --> 00:47:34,148 it's that democratic control is categorically the wrong shape for the object. 907 00:47:34,148 --> 00:47:36,800 You're trying to govern a network with a municipality. 908 00:47:37,550 --> 00:47:38,550 Number five. 909 00:47:38,757 --> 00:47:41,430 Five. Error is not a bug you can patch out, 910 00:47:41,430 --> 00:47:44,853 because the error rate multipliers against multiplies against volume, 911 00:47:44,853 --> 00:47:46,956 and the consequences of error are physical. 912 00:47:46,956 --> 00:47:51,841 Brittany Gilliam's nieces. This is not a story about a bad database entry. 913 00:47:51,841 --> 00:47:55,545 That's what a fractional error rate looks like when you cash it out at gunpoint, 914 00:47:55,545 --> 00:47:57,387 hundreds of times a year nationally. 915 00:47:58,450 --> 00:47:59,450 And six? 916 00:48:00,313 --> 00:48:03,005 six, and this is the one that closes the door on reform. 917 00:48:03,005 --> 00:48:07,387 The strongest guardrail law in the country was defeated by the vendor's 918 00:48:07,387 --> 00:48:10,148 own internal disorganization, not by malice. 919 00:48:10,148 --> 00:48:12,830 Illinois wrote a great statute in twenty twenty three, 920 00:48:12,830 --> 00:48:16,692 and in twenty twenty five we learned that the CBP was inside Illinois cameras 921 00:48:17,052 --> 00:48:20,174 through a pilot the vendor's leadership says it didn't even know about. 922 00:48:21,111 --> 00:48:24,947 You can't regulate a party that doesn't know what it's doing. 923 00:48:25,936 --> 00:48:29,127 Right. You can't regulate an entity that can't inventory itself, 924 00:48:29,127 --> 00:48:32,478 that can't audit itself. That's not a compliance fe failure you fix with 925 00:48:32,478 --> 00:48:35,478 a stricter clause, right? It that's not the kind of adjustment you can make. 926 00:48:35,478 --> 00:48:39,399 There is no clause that makes an organization comprehensible to itself. 927 00:48:39,399 --> 00:48:42,120 And every regulatory scheme we propose, 928 00:48:42,120 --> 00:48:45,301 audits, logs, attestations, sign offs, 929 00:48:45,301 --> 00:48:48,522 all of it assumes a counterparty capable of knowing and reporting 930 00:48:48,522 --> 00:48:50,082 the truth about its own systems. 931 00:48:50,082 --> 00:48:53,143 That assumption has now been tested in Illinois. 932 00:48:53,143 --> 00:48:54,143 Hard 933 00:48:54,447 --> 00:48:57,585 By a motivated statewide official was subpoena adjacent power, 934 00:48:57,585 --> 00:48:58,585 and it failed. 935 00:48:59,423 --> 00:49:00,957 I want to add the seventh actually, 936 00:49:00,957 --> 00:49:04,246 which is the one that I can't seem to let go of. 937 00:49:04,246 --> 00:49:06,813 It's about what the audits actually do. 938 00:49:07,717 --> 00:49:08,717 By all means. 939 00:49:09,309 --> 00:49:12,662 An audit is a is a legitimation ritual, 940 00:49:12,662 --> 00:49:17,354 okay? And I don't mean that that Gianulius did something wrong. 941 00:49:17,354 --> 00:49:22,659 I think I think his office is the most aggressive ALPR oversight work 942 00:49:22,659 --> 00:49:27,943 in the country, genuinely. And and Evanston and Oak Park left Flox Network 943 00:49:27,943 --> 00:49:29,805 in contract because of that. That's real. 944 00:49:29,805 --> 00:49:35,239 But look at the structural f function of the audit in the Cook County story. 945 00:49:35,989 --> 00:49:37,559 You ought to give them the vocabulary, 946 00:49:37,559 --> 00:49:38,559 right? 947 00:49:38,510 --> 00:49:41,601 Right, because once there's an audit regime, 948 00:49:41,601 --> 00:49:47,563 the answer to should we have this becomes we should have this correctly. 949 00:49:47,563 --> 00:49:51,645 The question shifts from existence to compliance. 950 00:49:51,645 --> 00:49:53,586 And compliance is a thing you can buy. 951 00:49:53,586 --> 00:49:56,527 It's a it's a line item. It's a it's a training module, 952 00:49:56,527 --> 00:50:00,098 it's a checkbox in the dashboard labeled Illinois mode. 953 00:50:00,848 --> 00:50:02,967 And the checkbox becomes the argument for expansion. 954 00:50:03,976 --> 00:50:07,320 The checkbox always becomes the argument for expansion. 955 00:50:07,320 --> 00:50:11,054 We've addressed the concerns, so now let's go from twenty five cameras 956 00:50:11,054 --> 00:50:12,426 to one hundred and twenty five. 957 00:50:12,426 --> 00:50:18,523 That's not like hypothetical. That happened one day after they admitted that they 958 00:50:18,523 --> 00:50:19,885 were operating without a contract. 959 00:50:21,380 --> 00:50:25,000 So here's the through line, and it lands differently now than it did an hour ago. 960 00:50:25,000 --> 00:50:28,490 A hyperlocal pitch becomes a national dragnet. 961 00:50:29,240 --> 00:50:31,951 I'll say it fully for you. A property crime in Atlanta, 962 00:50:31,951 --> 00:50:34,692 a murdered postal worker on I fifty seven, 963 00:50:34,692 --> 00:50:37,553 packages stolen off a porch in a subdivision. 964 00:50:37,553 --> 00:50:41,935 Every origin story in this industry is a real harm suffered by a real person, 965 00:50:41,935 --> 00:50:44,536 and every one of them is unanswerable in this moment. 966 00:50:44,536 --> 00:50:48,247 You cannot stand up at a village board meeting and argue against Tamara Clayton's 967 00:50:48,247 --> 00:50:49,868 family, and you shouldn't want to. 968 00:50:50,759 --> 00:50:51,994 But here's how the thing gets built. 969 00:50:53,146 --> 00:50:54,266 That's exactly how it gets built. 970 00:50:54,266 --> 00:50:58,310 And it's why it can't be argued down at the local level on local terms. 971 00:50:58,310 --> 00:51:02,252 Because at the local level, the pitch is always about the harm you can name. 972 00:51:02,252 --> 00:51:05,205 It's your neighbor, it's your it's your family member, 973 00:51:05,205 --> 00:51:08,077 right? And the cost is always something you can't see yet. 974 00:51:08,077 --> 00:51:10,819 It's that future surveillance when the law changes. 975 00:51:10,819 --> 00:51:13,300 When they make it a crime to be a part of a union. 976 00:51:13,300 --> 00:51:17,183 Nobody in Schomburg was choosing between no cameras and railroad police 977 00:51:17,183 --> 00:51:20,856 can search your movements. They were choosing between cameras and car break in. 978 00:51:21,678 --> 00:51:23,387 The four hundred agencies weren't on the ballot, 979 00:51:23,387 --> 00:51:24,534 they weren't even on the agenda. 980 00:51:25,297 --> 00:51:29,693 And nobody voted on that. And that phrase I've said it like four times today. 981 00:51:29,693 --> 00:51:33,248 I I wanna be precise about what I mean by it now, 982 00:51:33,248 --> 00:51:36,403 because it's not just a complaint about process. 983 00:51:37,658 --> 00:51:38,753 Tell us what you mean, Joshua. 984 00:51:39,600 --> 00:51:45,093 I mean that the consent doesn't exist and it cannot be manufactured after the fact. 985 00:51:45,093 --> 00:51:51,277 There is no procedure available to us that would retroactively legitimate four 986 00:51:51,777 --> 00:51:54,919 hundred agencies searching a suburb. 987 00:51:54,919 --> 00:52:00,042 You can't hold a hearing about it in 2026 and fix 2019. 988 00:52:00,042 --> 00:52:03,224 The record is made. The searches have already happened. 989 00:52:03,224 --> 00:52:05,205 The Texas Sheriff has already looked. 990 00:52:06,454 --> 00:52:08,243 Which is why the only frame is elimination. 991 00:52:09,721 --> 00:52:13,563 Elimination not because reform is insufficiently ambitious, 992 00:52:13,563 --> 00:52:16,785 because reform applied to this produces a permanent, 993 00:52:16,785 --> 00:52:21,188 better documented, more expensive version of the same problem, 994 00:52:21,188 --> 00:52:23,499 and then calls the documentation a victory. 995 00:52:24,842 --> 00:52:27,977 And the honest thing, the thing I'd say to a police chief or a sheriff, 996 00:52:27,977 --> 00:52:30,500 is that yes, you will lose some cases. 997 00:52:30,500 --> 00:52:34,086 That's true. Plate readers do solve crimes. 998 00:52:34,086 --> 00:52:36,249 We're not pretending otherwise. 999 00:52:36,249 --> 00:52:39,094 And anybody who tells you that a tool that logs every car everywhere 1000 00:52:39,094 --> 00:52:40,636 and never catches anyone is lying to you. 1001 00:52:42,001 --> 00:52:44,092 Question was never whether it works. 1002 00:52:44,984 --> 00:52:47,245 Exactly. Torture works sometimes. 1003 00:52:47,245 --> 00:52:49,195 General warrants worked great, 1004 00:52:49,195 --> 00:52:51,246 that's why the British Crown loved them. 1005 00:52:51,246 --> 00:52:55,777 The entire premise of a constitutional limit is that there are efficient things that 1006 00:52:55,777 --> 00:52:58,028 we don't get to do. And a mass, 1007 00:52:58,028 --> 00:53:00,869 permanent, retroactive, vendor owned, 1008 00:53:00,869 --> 00:53:04,170 four hundred party searchable record of where every American drives 1009 00:53:04,570 --> 00:53:07,390 is the most efficient general warrant ever constructed. 1010 00:53:07,390 --> 00:53:11,822 And it was installed by public s work public works crews with no vote 1011 00:53:11,822 --> 00:53:12,822 at any level of government. 1012 00:53:14,049 --> 00:53:18,082 So you're probably asking what you should be watching more closely. 1013 00:53:19,222 --> 00:53:21,130 Not the policy. It's never the policy. 1014 00:53:21,622 --> 00:53:26,074 It's never the policy. Watch the contract and watch the log. 1015 00:53:26,074 --> 00:53:30,175 Because here's the the fact from this story that proves it. 1016 00:53:30,175 --> 00:53:36,318 Schaumburg almost certainly has a perfectly reasonable ALPR policy. 1017 00:53:36,318 --> 00:53:39,699 I bet it says the data is retained for a limited period, 1018 00:53:39,699 --> 00:53:43,760 used for legitimate law enforcement purposes and shared only with authorized 1019 00:53:43,760 --> 00:53:50,713 agencies. And all of that can be true at the same time as four hundred agencies. 1020 00:53:51,019 --> 00:53:53,695 A railroad and for some reason a university. 1021 00:53:54,445 --> 00:53:57,769 Course that's also overlooking the fact that the argument has been made that 1022 00:53:57,769 --> 00:54:00,463 the data is public data now and belongs to the public. 1023 00:54:00,463 --> 00:54:04,538 So it's not really true that they can share it only with authorized agencies. 1024 00:54:04,538 --> 00:54:08,514 But because authorized is defined by the vendor's dashboard and not by you, 1025 00:54:08,514 --> 00:54:10,025 it wouldn't matter anyway, right? 1026 00:54:10,587 --> 00:54:15,193 Yeah. The the artifact that you want is the data sharing report and the audit log. 1027 00:54:15,193 --> 00:54:17,676 The report tells you who can look at it. 1028 00:54:17,676 --> 00:54:20,560 The log tells you who did, when, 1029 00:54:20,560 --> 00:54:23,043 and what they typed in the reason field. 1030 00:54:23,793 --> 00:54:26,094 And now the most absurd single thing in the story, 1031 00:54:26,094 --> 00:54:27,813 which we've been holding in all episodes 1032 00:54:28,607 --> 00:54:29,609 Go ahead, you can have it. 1033 00:54:30,359 --> 00:54:33,997 Remember a company valued at seven and a half billion dollars. 1034 00:54:33,997 --> 00:54:35,821 How much is that again, Joshua? 1035 00:54:36,495 --> 00:54:37,495 Ba ba billion. 1036 00:54:38,563 --> 00:54:42,861 whose only product is a system for controlling who can see whose location data, 1037 00:54:42,861 --> 00:54:47,049 did not know that the United States customs and border protection 1038 00:54:47,631 --> 00:54:48,713 was inside the company. 1039 00:54:49,447 --> 00:54:52,308 they found out from a state official in Springfield running an audit 1040 00:54:52,729 --> 00:54:54,649 in a state where the thing was already illegal, 1041 00:54:54,649 --> 00:54:58,671 and through that same lens, the lens where you stop reading policies 1042 00:54:58,671 --> 00:55:00,231 and start reading operational records, 1043 00:55:00,231 --> 00:55:02,172 it's not an embarrassing anecdote, 1044 00:55:02,172 --> 00:55:03,913 it's the whole design confessing. 1045 00:55:03,913 --> 00:55:07,934 The network is too big for its owner to know and it's nowhere near done growing. 1046 00:55:09,051 --> 00:55:10,854 So three things you can actually do, 1047 00:55:10,854 --> 00:55:15,033 and these are not contact or representative because we've stopped doing that now. 1048 00:55:15,783 --> 00:55:19,565 One, be Jason Hunyar for somewhere that isn't your your hometown. 1049 00:55:19,565 --> 00:55:22,146 He's in Georgia and he pulled Illinois records. 1050 00:55:22,146 --> 00:55:24,987 Most state records laws do not require you to be a resident, 1051 00:55:24,987 --> 00:55:28,568 do not require standing, and do not require you to explain why you want it. 1052 00:55:28,568 --> 00:55:31,289 Pick a jurisdiction, any jurisdiction, 1053 00:55:31,289 --> 00:55:35,371 one you've never been to, and request the ALPR data sharing report 1054 00:55:35,371 --> 00:55:37,732 and the audit logs. Not the policy, 1055 00:55:37,732 --> 00:55:42,074 the report and the logs. Then publish this whole thing raw. 1056 00:55:42,074 --> 00:55:44,775 The network is borderless, so it's so is the Record Act. 1057 00:55:45,437 --> 00:55:46,685 Use their geometry against them. 1058 00:55:47,931 --> 00:55:51,382 Two, go where the friction is the lowest, 1059 00:55:51,382 --> 00:55:54,283 which is not City Hall. It's the HOA, 1060 00:55:54,283 --> 00:55:59,464 it's the university campus. Flock's original customers were just HOAs. 1061 00:55:59,464 --> 00:56:04,736 And an HOA board can cancel a camera contract in one meeting with no public hearing, 1062 00:56:04,736 --> 00:56:07,927 no procurement code, and no state law in the way. 1063 00:56:07,927 --> 00:56:10,937 That's a seat somebody's going to fill this year. 1064 00:56:10,937 --> 00:56:14,218 Fill it. And the universities were on Schomberg's list. 1065 00:56:14,218 --> 00:56:16,469 A university police subscription can be kept. 1066 00:56:16,558 --> 00:56:19,895 Killed by one provost, one Board of Trustees vote, 1067 00:56:19,895 --> 00:56:24,043 one faculty Senate resolution with a student newspaper behind it. 1068 00:56:24,043 --> 00:56:25,667 Nobody's guarding those doors. 1069 00:56:27,136 --> 00:56:29,007 Three, change what you demand. 1070 00:56:29,007 --> 00:56:31,668 Stop asking for a better policy because you'll get one, 1071 00:56:31,668 --> 00:56:34,369 and it'll be beautiful and it will not matter. 1072 00:56:34,369 --> 00:56:36,650 Ask for two documents instead, 1073 00:56:36,650 --> 00:56:39,412 a termination date and a deletion certificate. 1074 00:56:39,412 --> 00:56:44,364 A signed attestation from the vendor that historical data associated with your 1075 00:56:44,364 --> 00:56:45,795 jurisdiction has been destroyed, 1076 00:56:45,795 --> 00:56:47,856 with the date and the record count. 1077 00:56:47,856 --> 00:56:50,437 Watch what happens to the room when you ask for the record count. 1078 00:56:51,309 --> 00:56:52,553 Because they can't produce it. 1079 00:56:53,577 --> 00:56:57,343 They usually cannot produce it and that's your answer about who actually owns 1080 00:56:57,343 --> 00:56:58,343 the record of where you've been. 1081 00:56:58,985 --> 00:57:01,607 Alright guys, that's it. That's our flock episode. 1082 00:57:01,607 --> 00:57:03,298 A couple of you've been asking for it, 1083 00:57:03,298 --> 00:57:06,030 so there you go. this is the overlap. 1084 00:57:06,030 --> 00:57:08,342 You've you've been listening to us so far now. 1085 00:57:09,092 --> 00:57:12,366 One more thing before we go. You've probably already been flocked. 1086 00:57:12,366 --> 00:57:15,389 Most of us have. But you don't have to keep getting flocked. 1087 00:57:15,389 --> 00:57:19,654 So get the flock up, go to your flocking records agencies, 1088 00:57:19,654 --> 00:57:23,469 police departments and and demand a flocking change. 1089 00:57:24,219 --> 00:57:25,692 I th I think you're more than capable. 1090 00:57:25,692 --> 00:57:27,997 you want the groan of like hundreds of voices, 1091 00:57:27,997 --> 00:57:28,997 right? 1092 00:57:28,988 --> 00:57:30,210 And all the ways not to do that. 1093 00:57:30,960 --> 00:57:32,458 Well if that doesn't do it for you folks, 1094 00:57:32,458 --> 00:57:33,785 I don't know what will. So 1095 00:57:34,535 --> 00:57:35,535 That's the overlap. 1096 00:57:36,058 --> 00:57:38,118 Indeed. I